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BUYING OUT INSURGENT SHAREHOLDERS WITH
CORPORATE FUNDS*
MANAGEMENT'S use of corporate funds to purchase stock held by potential
insurgents may protect the corporation from being taken over by less competent
or perhaps unscrupulous management, but the power to make such purchases is
also an effective device which the incumbent management may use to insulate its
position against shareholder action. Management already possesses significant
advantages when its control is challenged in a proxy contest; these include the
power to use corporate funds for reasonable solicitation expenditures,1 con-
trol over the proxy machinery,2 the favor of financial institutions holding
large blocks of voting stock,3 and the benefit of inertia supporting the status
quo.4 Proxy contests for control are still waged, however, and sometimes
won. 5 Therefore, the incumbent management may seek other means to prevent
the proxy contest from materializing. Those in control can accomplish this
end if, acting as shareholders, they use private funds to buy out the insurgents
or to purchase an absolute or working majority of the voting shares.
If the directors cause the corporation to purchase its own shares for this
purpose, however, their action may be found a violation of the directors'
obligations to the corporation and its stockholders. Of those jurisdictions in
which the law grants a corporation the general power to purchase its shares,"
only Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Delaware appear to have dealt specifically
with this problem.7 A Massachusetts court has held that when a corporation
*Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).
1. E.g., Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Co., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226
(Ch. 1934) ; Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955). See generally, Latcham & Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and Share-
holder Democracy, 4 W. RES. L. Rxv. 5 (1952).
2. See LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 45 (1958).
3. See EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 142 (1954); cf. ARANow
& EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5 (1957).
4. See LIVINGSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45.
5. From 1954 to June 30, 1957, according to SEC records, there were 43 proxy
contests for control. See LIVINGSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 47 n.7. For several examples
of proxy contests won by insurgents, see KARR, FIGHT FOR CONTROL (1956).
6. For a compilation of the state law relating to the power of a corporation to pur-
chase its own shares, see appendix A.
7. The law in Great Britain is that no company may purchase its shares for any pur-
pose. Trever v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887). One of the principal considerations
of the House of Lords was the possible use of the power for the purpose of retaining
control :
Can it be contended that when the policy of directors is assailed they may spend the
capital of the company in keeping themselves in power, or in purchasing the retire-
ment of inquisitive and troublesome critics?
. . . If shareholders think it worth while to spend money for the purpose of
getting rid of a troublesome partner who is willing to sell, they may put their
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purchased its shares in order to give the directors majority control by reduc-
ing the total number of shares outstanding, the purchase was a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duty and a willful disregard of the rights of other share-
holders.8 The court reasoned that retention of control was not a proper cor-
porate purpose for which funds of the corporation could be spent.9 The
decision was based on an analogy to the law of that state which forbids the
sale of treasury shares for the purpose of ensuring the incumbent directors'
control of the corporation,10 holding that there is no significant difference be-
tween manipulating corporate control by causing the corporation to buy its
shares or by causing it to sell shares." The same general conclusion is suggested
by dictum in a Wisconsin case: although the directors' purpose in effecting the
corporation's purchase was found not to be the creation of a controlling
interest, the court indicated that, had the purpose been retention of control,
the purchase would have been a violation of the directors' duty.-2 Although
reference to "the purpose" of a purchase may convey an oversimplified view of
director motivation in such a transaction, judicial determination of such issues
is itself necessarily oversimplified. The phrase may fairly be interpreted as a
finding that the forbidden purpose was the principle reason for the transaction.
An exception to these decisions has been created in situations where the
purchase of shares is justified by some other corporate purpose, such as the
need to reduce outstanding shares,' 3 even though the purchase may in
fact solidify management's control. This distinction becomes blurred when the
directors cause the corporation to purchase its stock because they believe that
their continued control will benefit the corporation. If desire to retain control
bars the purchase, management will be unable to head off a bid for control by
hands in their own pockets and buy him out, though they cannot draw on a fund
in which others as well as themselves are interested.
Id. at 435-36 (Lord Macnaghten).
8. Anderson v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541
(1950).
9. Id. at 346-47, 90 N.E.2d at 544.
10. Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
11. Anderson v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346-47, 90 N.E.
2d 541, 544 (1950) ; cf. Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 507, 163 N.E.
184, 187 (1928) ; L. E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 175 N.E.
86 (1931).
12. Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 478, 123 N.W. 102, 103 (1909). The purpose
of the purchase was found to be the withdrawal from the corporation of one of the two
principal shareholders, to resolve an inability to work together. Id. at 476, 123 N.W. at
102.
Cf. Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918) (sale of
,treasury stock) ; Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903) (sale of
unissued shares).
13. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Co., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct.
1952) ; see Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909) (to break manage-
ment deadlock) ; cf. Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 255-56, 17 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Ch.
1941) (issuance of shares for services rendered).
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unsavory insurgents. On the other hand, if the directors are permitted to use
corporate funds to make such stock purchases, their ability to secure their own
position against shareholder attack will be significantly increased. An early
Massachusetts' decision seems to have rejected the notion that manipulation
of stock to retain control can be justified by the directors' belief that such
manipulation will benefit the corporation.14 Delaware courts, however, have
recently held that retention of control might be a proper corporate purpose if,
absent fraud or unfairness, the reason for purchasing the shares was to eliminate
a stockholder whose policy was at odds with that of the current management. 1
The extent of this Delaware doctrine is illustrated by the recent case of
Kors v. Carey.16 A minority shareholder brought a derivative action against
the directors of Lehn & Fink Products Corporation alleging that the use of
corporate rather than personal funds to purchase a large block of the corpora-
tion's stock 17 held by another corporation, United Whelan, was improper.
The plaintiff maintained that the purpose of the purchase was self-serving
retention of control by the directors, and that a purchase for that purpose
was a breach of the directors' duty to the corporation. The directors based
their defense principally on the grounds that, in view of the "quick profit"
business record of United Whelan and its dominant shareholder, Charles
Green, United Whelan's holding of a significant block of Lehn & Fink stock
posed a threat to the distinguished business reputation established through
the incumbent management's traditional manufacturing and distribution
policies.' 8
The Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the purchase. The court, relying
on a previous Delaware decision,19 first concluded that purchase of shares for
the purpose of eliminating a challenge to management's control was not per se
invalid.2 0 The court then looked to the propriety of the purchase in the in-
14. Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 522-23, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907).
15. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Co., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
16. 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960). The case involved three actions: first, an action
by Bertha Kors against the directors of Lehn & Fink Products Corp. and the corpora-
tion; second, an action by Bertha Kors against United Whelan Corporation; and third,
a cross-claim by United Whelan against Lehn & Fink. Id. at 137-38. This note deals only
with the first action.
17. United Whelan had purchased 60,200 shares of Lehn & Fink stock, amounting to
approximately 16% of the 400,000 shares issued and outstanding. See id. at 139.
18. Id. at 139-40. Also, United Whelan was a customer of Lehn & Fink and the
directors of Lehn & Fink feared alienation of its other customers if it were to become
dominated by United Whelan. The management also feared prosecutions under the anti-
trust laws which might arise from abuse of this clieht-customer relationship. Ibid.
19. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Co., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct.
1952), discussed in text at note 15 supra.
20. The statutory authority for purchase by a Delaware corporation of its shares is
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953):
Every corporation . . . may purchase, hold, sell and transfer shares of its own
capital stock; but no such corporation shall use its funds or property for the pur-
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stant case, and found that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of prov-
ing "fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion such as would compel a court
of equity to find the individual defendants guilty of a breach of their fiduciary
duty."21 The court found as a matter of fact that the policies advocated by
Green were inconsistent with those of the directors of Lehn & Fink, and it
concluded that the directors were correct in their expectation that such a
divergence would have led to a contest for control. While the vice chancellor's
opinion seems to agree with management's belief that the corporation would
be damaged if control were lost to Green,22 an explicit finding to that effect
was not made.23 Thus the decision seems to hold that the prospect of a change
in corporate policy, believed by the directors to be detrimental, was itself suf-
ficient justification for the purchase; proof that the insurgents would actually
harm the corporation if they won control was not required. The court distin-
guished other Delaware cases holding manipulation of corporate stock to retain
control illegal 24 by remarking that those cases involved retention of control
for selfish personal reasons, whereas in this case control was retained to defend
management policy.26 This test is similar to that used in determining whether
corporate funds can be used to pay the expenses of management in a proxy
fight.20 Indeed, the court relied on the acknowledged right to spend corporate
funds for proxy expenses as support for the corporate expenditure in Kors,
and commented that the cost to the corporation was less than the cost of the
proxy fight which was avoidedV7
chase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would cause any impair-
ment of the capital of the corporation.
21. 158 A.2d at 140.
22. Id. at 139.
23. Compare McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1958) (apply-
ing Massachusetts law; court seems to make finding that insurgents have illegal motives)
(dictum).
24. Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 AtI. 19 (Ch.
1937) (extensive and complicated manipulations) ; see also Bowen v. Imperial Theatres,
Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 120, 129, 115 Atl. 918, 922 (Ch. 1922) (no consideration for issue of
new shares and shareholders' preemptive right violated); Kingston v. Home Life Ins.
Co., 11 Del. Ch. 258, 263-64, 101 Ati. 898, 900 (Ch. 1917) (dictum); Yasik v. Wachtel,
25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Ch. 1941) (dictum).
25. 158 A.2d at 141.
26. See authorities cited note 1 supra.
27. 158 A.2d at 141.
The court said in dictum that even if an improper motive had been shown, plaintiff
had not suffered a legal injury. The court reasoned that plaintiff still had a right to vote,
that she never had a legal right to vote for a "Green sponsored management," and that,
in fact, she as well as all other shareholders had benefited financially from the purchase
because of the subsequent rise in the market value of Lehn & Fink shares held as treasury
stock by the corporation. Id. at 142.
The finding that the plaintiff was financially benefited is not supported. While it is
possible that the purchase may benefit the shareholders if their fractional ownership is
increased by paying less than the worth of the shares eliminated, the court's reliance on
the fact that the market value of Lehn & Fink shares, purchased from United Whelan at
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The court's distinction between personal and policy motives is almost im-
possible to apply. Courts which use the same distinction to justify corporate
payment of management's proxy contest expenses have recognized this diffi-
culty.28 Even when one side principally attacks the ability, character, experi-
ence, or business reputation of its opponents, policy alternatives will usual-
ly be presented as a matter of form.29 In this context, there is little chance of
proving that the directors have spent money solely because they want to keep
their jobs. If, as in Kors, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the man-
agement's personal motives, almost any corporate purchase of an insurgent's
shares can be justified.30
Conceding, however, that the directors who bring about the purchase are
clearly defending their policy of management, the manner in which the cor-
porate funds are used must still be justified as a proper exercise of their
power. The Kors court's reliance upon the power of directors to expend a
$28, had risen to $45-$48 per share, 158 A.2d at 138, does not necessarily reflect this
benefit; the market price of the stock may not reflect its value in terms of reduced par-
ticipation, and even market value may decline if the large block is placed on the market
again. Treasury shares are not considered an asset of a corporation, see PATON, AcCOUNT-
ANTS' HANDBOOK 1008-09 (3d ed. 1945); BAKER & CAREY, CORPORATIONS 1428 (3d ed.
1959), and if the shares are resold, no profit or loss can be considered realized, PATON,
ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 548 (1941).
Financial injury was possible. The cost of the purchase of 60,200 shares was $1,715,700,
158 A.2d at 138, financed by an insurance company loan, Brief for Defendant, p. 84. This
change in the financial position of Lehn & Fink could have reduced its opportunities for
expansion and hindered efforts to obtain further credit.
Moreover, financial injury in the specific case may not be a necessary element if the
directors have impinged on the voting rights of the shareholders. Nonfinancial injury
seems to have been sufficient in analogous cases. See Anderson v. Albert & J. M. Ander-
son Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 345-47, 90 N.E.2d 541, 543-44 (1950) (disregard of the
rights of shareholders) ; Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 123-24, 94 N.W. 69,
72-73 (1903) (injury to stockholders need not be financial). Thus only the first premise
of the court's dictum regarding injury need be disproved to support the action.
28. See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying Del-
aware law); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 84-85,
171 At. 226, 228 (Ch. 1934). Courts continue to use this distinction, however, when con-
sidering the problem. See Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 651
(D. Del. 1944) (motion for preliminary injunction denied, leaving question of whether
or not there was involved a substantial question of policy for further hearing) ; Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). Only one
early case has been found in which use of the distinction resulted in disallowing expendi-
tures. Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187
N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907).
29. See Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 951,
952-53 (1951). See also 34 CHI.-KENT L. Rzv. 154, 155 (1956).
30. See Friedman, supra note 29, at 953:
The result of this legal shadow boxing is that rarely are management expendi-
tures [in proxy contests] disallowed because deemed to be personal. Thus, in actu-
ality the management has a call upon the corporation treasury no matter what form
the issue between it and the minority may take.
[Vol. 70: 308
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reasonable amount of corporate funds to defend their policies in a proxy fight
is inappropriate. The policy underlying the allowance of proxy expenditures
is to inform the shareholder-electorate so that it may vote intelligently.3' This
policy is not served by corporate expenditures which eliminate the occasion to
vote and a fortiori the need to inform the shareholders of the competing
policies. The only common characteristic of proxy expenditures and expendi-
tures to purchase an insurgent's shares is that both help management to win
the battle of control-an unlikely justification for either.
Moreover, the use of corporate funds to buy out insurgents is offensive to
the underlying premise of the proxy-expenditure doctrine-that decisions
about policy and management in contests for control should be made by the
stockholders. Here the powers of the directors are used to interfere with the
operation of the corporation's electoral process. Admittedly, all stockholders
still have the power to vote and to pass upon management's policy at the
following election. But effective opposition to management within a publicly
held corporation requires a shareholder with a nucleus of votes who is capable
of mobilizing the scattered and generally unconcerned voters holding the bal-
ance of electoral power.32 By using corporate funds to remove this nucleus,
the directors have in fact prevented this challenge from coming to a vote be-
fore all the stockholders. The fact that the insurgent has voluntarily withdrawn
from a possible proxy contest should not obscure the role of the directors in
effectuating such a withdrawal. The insurgent will probably be motivated by the
expectation of profit from managing the enterprise. If part of that profit can
be realized quickly, or if a better opportunity presents itself elsewhere, he can
31. See Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 81, 171
At. 226, 227 (Ch. 1934) :
[T]he incumbent directors may with perfect propriety make such expenditures from
the corporate treasury as are reasonably necessary to inform the stockholders of
the considerations which the directors deem sufficient to support the wisdom of the
policy advocated by them and under attack; and in the same communications which
the directors address to the stockholders in support of their policy they may solicit
proxies in its favor.
See Peel v. London & N.W. Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. 5, 19 (obtaining the best expression of
the corporator's views) ; Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 650
(D. Del. 1944) ("inform stockholders") ; Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955) ("persuading the stockholders of the cor-
rectness of their position"). Winning insurgents may look to the corporation for reim-
bursement under the same theory. Ibid.; Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (applying Delaware law).
See also Friedman, supra note 29, at 953; Latcham & Emerson, srupra note 1, at 14;
Comment, 49 MIcu. L. REv. 605, 608 (1951); Note, Proxy Solicitation Expenses, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 825, 829 (1956).
32. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1483, 1487 (1958) (criticizing
the shareholders' dependence upon insurgents) ; ARANow & EINEaORN, op. cit. supra note
3, at 19; LvNGSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44-46. For comments on the prevalent at-
titudes of shareholders, see EMERSON & LATCHAM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10; LiVINGS-
ToN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 26, 36-38, 42-43; Manning, supra at 1487 ("stubbornly un-
interested in exerting control").
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be expected to sell his holding, provided that the sale can be made expeditious-
ly and without depressing the value of his shares. To satisfy this final con-
dition, someone with sufficient capital must purchase the potential insurgent's
shares in one large fransaction. While it cannot be said that but for the use
of corporate funds such a transaction could not have been effectuated or that
the insurgent would 'not have sold out under less profitable circumstances, the
pover to use' corporate funds for this purpose will greatly facilitate the exit
of the opposing shareholder, and may in a given case be determinative of
Whether or not the insurgent will sell out.33
The objection to this use of the directors' official powers is not based upon
an assumption that the stockholders' voting right includes the right to have an
insurgent for whom to vote. Obviously, the directors, as any other stock-
holders, could eliminate the insurgent by using their own funds to buy him
out.34 Indeed, the incumbent directors could purchase a majority of the
vcoting shares and permanently foreclose any effective shareholder challenge to
their control. Alternatively, the incumbents could reach an accord with the
insurgents,35 or the insurgents themselves could decide to forego the contest
for control. By any'6f these means, the neutral shareholders would be denied
the opportunity to vote against management as effectively as if the corpora-
tion itself had purchased the insurgents' holdings.
The objection arises only when the directors, by using corporate funds, use
their office to tamper with the electoral process. This exercise of power seems
inconsistent with the division of function between directors and the stock-
holder-electorate which is contemplated in the statutory provisions stating
that directors shall be elected by the shareholders.36 While the directors' action
in Kors does not offend this provision as openly as would, for example, the
act of directors reappointing themselves without any vote,37 arguably it
33. In many cases the cost to private purchasers would be prohibitive. The cost in
Kors was $1,715,700. See note 27 supra. Had such a purchase been made prior to other
recent contests for control, such as the successful fights of Young for the New York
Central and Green for United Whelan, or to preclude Green's unsuccessful bid for Twen-
tieth Century-Fox, the cost would, likewise, have been great. Young controlled 800,000
shares, see K~A, op. cit. supra note 5, at 21, which in 1954 sold from 18 to 34-Y,
MOODY, TRaNSPORTATION MANUAL a89 (1956). Green owned 87,000 shares of United
Whelan, see KaR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 97, which in 1951 had a total market value
of from $282,750 to $445,875, see MOODY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1195 (1953). The 44,700
shares of Twentieth Century-Fox Owned by Green, see KARR, op. cit. Supra note 5, at
130, had a market value in 1953 of from 13% to 213s per share, MooDY, INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL a100 (1956).
34. See note 7 supra.
35. See ARANOW & EINHORN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7; LNGSTON, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 48.
36. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 212, 222 (1953); MAss. ANN. LAws, ch.
156, §§ 22, 32 (1959) ; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:7-1 (1939) ; see 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS §§ 283, 285 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954) ; BALLANTINE, CORPoRATIONS § 158
(rev. ed. 1946) ; Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 825, 826 (1956).
37. See Johnston v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 30 Del. Ch. 324, 60 A.2d 455 (Ch.
1948), aff'd, 31 Del. Ch. 469, 64 A.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (bylaw and director action
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results in the same kind of interference with the corporation's electoral sys-
tem. Courts have condemned other indirect forms of director interference, such
as manipulation of control through the issuance of new 3 8 or treasury shares,
3 9
the voting of treasury shares, 40 and the forced redemption of certain hold-
ings.4 1 In contrast, the use of corporate funds to pay for management's proxy
expenses does not transgress this separation of function, for there the final
decision on the issue involved is left to the shareholders.4 2
pursuant thereto in creating new directorships and filling them as vacancies held illegal
-right of shareholders to vote cannot be delegated) ; Penn-Texas Corp. v. Niles-Bement-
Pond Co., 34 N.J. Super. 373, 380, 112 A.2d 302, 306 (1955) (directors' change in by-
law postponing meeting and thus extending term of office held illegal). The court in
Pcnn-Texas quoted an 1883 case to the same effect:
That provision of the charter which declares that annual meetings of the stock-
holders shall be held for the election of directors, grants to the stockholders a high-
ly important and valuable right, which the directors can neither defeat nor impair.
Ibid.
38. See Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903) ; BALLANTINE,
op. cit. supra note 36, § 209; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 526 (1942). But see McPhail v. L. S.
Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958) (dictum).
39. See Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Dunn v. Acme Auto
& Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918).
40. See Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). This conduct is now
usually prohibited by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953) ; MASs. ANN.
LAWS ch. 156, § 31 (1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-8 (1939); BALLANTINE, op. Cit.
supra note 36, § 176. For a rationale of this rule, see ARANOW & EINHORN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 354 ("As a matter of equity these [treasury] shares should be denied the vot-
ing right, since the right, if it existed, would always be exercised by the management to
perpetuate itself.").
41. See Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Atl. 887 (Ch.),
aff'd per curiam, 21 Del. Ch. 431, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Greene v. E. H. Rollins
& Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1937). Read together these cases indicate, by
way of dicta, that if there were statutory power to redeem common stock, such power
could not be used for the purpose of getting "rid of certain stockholders of a given class
solely because their presence in the stockholding group was undesirable to the rest."
Id. at 400-01, 2 A.2d at 252; Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., supra at 384, 191
Atl. at 890.
42. The desirability of preserving the integrity of the stockholder electoral system
may, of course, be disputed.
For the last generation, the prevailing school of thought among corporate re-
formers, writers and legislators has been that the key to ensuring managerial re-
sponsibility lies in the shareholder's power to vote.
Manning, supra note 32, at 1486. See ARANOW & EINHORN, op. cit. supra note 3; EMER-
SON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954); Gnmmi, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOC-
RACY (1956).
On the other hand, Manning, supra 'note 32, at 1490, presents, for examinatiorn, an
"arbitrary model" of a corporate structure which "abandons the a priori legal conclusion
that the shareholders 'own the corporation' and substitutes the more restricted conception
that the only thing they 'own' is their shares of stock." See also BERLE & MEANS, MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 354-55 (1940).
But since elimination of shareholder franchise would require the substitution of other
controls, Manning, supra note 32, at 1491, its possible desirability cannot weigh in a court's
decision under the existing statutory scheme of control.
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The possible reasons for giving this decision-making power to the directors
are not convincing. The opinion in the Kors case seems to suggest that eras-
ing the opportunity for insurgents to gain control may itself be a proper end.
43
Fear that the insurgents' business policy will harm the corporation, or that
the insurgents may intend to defraud other stockholders seem to be urged as
the reason for circumventing the eventual shareholder decision. Dicta in a
First Circuit decision, McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co.,44 suggests that a reason-
able fear of fraud may even justify the directors' forcing the insurgent out of
a challenging position by issuing new stock to reduce his percentage holding.
The insurgents' opportunity to gain control can bear fruit, however, only if
enough uncommitted shareholders vote for the insurgents to give them a ma-
jority, or if the insurgents themselves buy a majority interest. In either case,
according to any conception of shareholder-franchise, the insurgents would be
entitled to control. Avoiding this result can be considered a proper end only
if it is assumed that the shareholders are likely to make an unwise choice
when solicited, and that the choice could better be made by the directors. To
give the decision to the directors, however, will be to allow them the choice
of whether or not they should continue in office. It is doubtful that decisions
by persons so interested will, in the long run, protect shareholder interests better
than the decisions of the shareholders themselves.45 Even where the likelihood of
fraud is present, a court should consider whether the alternative means of pro-
tecting the corporation are so inadequate that it must sanction a further preventa-
tive which gives directors a powerful and practically uncontrollable 4 weapon
against stockholder challenges. If the directors' prediction of fraud is reason-
able and is supported by evidence from present or prior transactions, the direc-
tors' ability to use that information in a proxy contest makes it likely that
the insurgent will not be accepted by the shareholders. And even if the in-
surgent wins the proxy contest, or purchases control, the protection afforded
by a suspecting shareholders' close scrutiny and the availability of equitable
relief 47 if and when fraud is attempted should not be discounted.
43. 158 A.2d at 141. The court's apparent equation of the costs of the purchase with
the costs of a proxy fight seem to assume that the result would, or should, be the same
in either case.
44. 257 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1958). The shareholders gave prior approval of the
issuance. Id. at 391; see text at notes 53-55 infra.
45. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Sup.
Ct. 1952):
Human nature being what it is, the law, in its wisdom, does not presume that
directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment of their company where
fairness must be at their own personal expense.
46. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
47. See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 36, § 66. Injunctive relief may also be avail-
able in some cases to prevent the suspected fraud from occurring. See, e.g., Bowman Shoe
Co. v. Bowman, 21 111. App. 2d 423, 158 N.E.2d 112 (1959) (directors temporarily en-
joined from drawing allegedly excessive salaries or voting their absolute majority shares,
pending further proceedings) ; Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 315, 324, 54




Another reason for allowing directors to short-circuit the proxy contest is
suggested by the Kors court's observation that the cost of the purchase was
less than the cost of the avoided proxy fight. Proxy contests are indeed costly,
perhaps even wasteful.48 But since cost is a universal factor in all proxy fights,
that ground alone seems an insufficient reason for avoiding a shareholder vote.
The unspoken assumption in this argument is the belief that, with or without
the proxy contest, the result would have been the same-that is, that the in-
surgent would have lost. This assumption is inconsistent with the fear of the
insurgent which apparently justified the Kors purchase. But even if the only
justification advanced is the directors' belief that the insurgent will fail, the
argument remains dubious. It would seem impossible in most cases to make
an accurate estimate of probable success before the proxy campaign begins. And
if the insurgents' chances are so slight that such an appraisal can be made, should
not that judgment by the directors lead them to reduce their own proxy ex-
penses?
In the absence of a valid reason to sustain this power, directors should not be
permitted to cause the corporation to purchase its shares if their motive is to
preclude the challenge of an insurgent. There may be instances, however, in
which the directors can justify the corporation's purchase on some independent
ground, even though the result of the transaction is also to eliminate a poten-
tial challenger. 49 Thus the motive of the directors must be proved to
sustain a cause of action. In determining motive, the assignment of the burden
of proof on this issue is crucial. Since the facts which indicate the motivation
of such a purchase are probably accessible only to the directors, to compel the
plaintiff to prove the intent of the purchase would impose an almost insur-
mountable burden, and would, in effect, insulate the directors' action from
challenge. Thus it might be more realistic to shift the burden to the directors,
after the plaintiff-shareholder makes a reasonable showing that the purchase
resulted in the elimination of a shareholder whom the directors viewed as a
potential insurgent.50 Although the burden of proof rests somewhat easier
upon defendants than it would on plaintiffs, it may still be dispositive in many
cases. This disadvantage seems consonant, however, with the general doctrine
that directors must prove the fairness of corporate transactions which work
to their personal advantage.51
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court should realize that the
main impact of the relief will be deterrent rather than remedial since no
48. Cf. Manning, supra note 32, at 1488.
49. For examples of financial motives not related to the undesirability of the opposing
shareholders, see cases cited note 13 supra.
50. See 9 WiGomRE, EvIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940) (burden placed on party who
presumably has a peculiar means of knowledge) ; Morgan, Some Observations Concern-
ing Presumptions, 44 HAv. L. Rav. 906, 911 (1939).
51. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ; Zweifach v. Scranton Lace
Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 396-97 (M.D. Pa. 1957) ; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1952). But see Baron v. Pressed Metals of America,
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remedy could restore the status quo. Further, the relief must not injure the
financial position of the corporation or its shareholders. The decision of the
court will be complicated by intervening market fluctuations of the purchased
shares and by the possibility that persons will be rewarded or punished un-
justly by unrelated market events. Rescission seems inappropriate, because the
selling stockholder may be able to resist on lack of notice, and because he may
receive a windfall if the shares increase in value. One possible remedy is the
requirement that the directors purchase the shares from the corporation, at
current market price or at the purchase price, whichever is higher. Interest
costs could also be added. 52 The effect of such a remedy would be to place
the directors in approximately the same position they would have been in if
they had defended their position of control properly-with their own funds.
Both the interest charge and the possibility of being forced to purchase the
shares after a decline in market price are not always deterrents. If the direc-
tors had intended to buy and hold the stock, they would have had to incur
the same risk and cost. For most, however, the remedy does impose a hard-
ship by removing the opportunity to resell the shares on the market soon after
buying out the insurgent-thus raising the interest cost and preventing sale
in a falling market.
To say that directors cannot use corporate funds to eliminate a challenge
to management and its policies is not to say that a majority of the stock-
holders cannot vote to buy out the insurgents with corporate funds. Admitted-
ly, the issue before the shareholders in this case would not be exactly the
same issue that the proxy contest would have presented, since the insurgent,
presumably favoring the purchase, will not criticize management policies or
advocate his own. Therefore, a choice between adverse policies is not expressly
35 Del. Ch. 325, 338, 117 A.2d 357, 364 (Ch. 1955), aff'd, 123 A.2d 848 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1956) ; Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 321, 90 N.E.2d 530, 531 (1950).
Nearly every writer who has considered the granting of power to purchase the cor-
poration's own shares has criticized it on the ground that it is used, with few exceptions,
for undesirable purposes. See Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its
Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697-98, 706 (1941) ; Glenn, Treas-
ury Stock, 15 VA. L. REv. 625, 638-42 (1929) ; Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern
Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 637-38 (1960) ; Levy, Purchase by a Corporation
of Its Own Stock, 15 MiNN. L. REv. 1, 5-11 (1930); Nemmers, The Power of a Cor-
poration To Purchase Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 161, 165-67; Nussbaum, Ac-
quisition by a Corporation of Its Own Stock, 35 CoLum. L. Rxv. 971, 978-81 (1935);
Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1177, 1179 (1950). But see Wormser, The Power of a Corporation
To Acquire Its Own Stock, 24 YAIm L.J. 177 (1915).
52. The legal interest, which is 6% per annum in Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2301 (1953), would be the proper rate to charge because that is the rate the corpora-
tion might be able to earn had it used its assets other than to purchase treasury shares.
If, however, the financing of the purchase cost the corporation more than the legal rate,
the directors should be made to reimburse the corporation to the extent of its additional




before the shareholders. Rather, those voting to authorize the purchase are
expressing their wish that this insurgent be encouraged not to seek the vote,
or the shares, of their fellow shareholders. If the shareholders are fully in-
formed, this would seem to be a proper course of shareholder action. The
difficulty with this procedure is that the information given the shareholders
is likely to be inadequate. No rebuttal to management's warning of danger to
the corporation can be expected, since both management and the insurgent
have a common interest in persuading the shareholders that the purchase is
desirable.r' This probability should not lead to the conclusion that the share-
holders cannot authorize the directors to buy out an insurgent. There will be
cases, particularly when the corporation is small or when the insurgent is well
known, in which the electorate is fully informed. Since the abuse arises from in-
sufficient disclosure, perhaps the appropriate check is to set a high standard re-
garding the completeness of disclosure before approving the authorization. Sim-
ilarly, a statute requiring that every non-pro-rata purchase by a corporation of its
own shares receive prior authorization by more than a simple majority might
counteract the potential lack of disclosure. Of those statutes which, under certain
circumstances, require authorization before a corporation can purchase its stock,
most require more than a simple majority. 4 Although courts might also require,
by reference to a doctrine sometimes employed in fraud cases,55 that only the
53. The danger of misinformation is not of the sort that will violate SEC disclosure
requirements, see 17 C.F.R. M 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-10 (Supp. 1960), because the crucial
element is an unchallenged management opinion about the future action of someone else.
54. See ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1957) (certain financial
limitations waived if Ys of those entitled to vote concur); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-63
(1958) (absolute requirement of approval of Y of all capital stockholders voting at a
special meeting unless purpose is to prevent loss upon a debt) (to be replaced Jan. 1, 1961
by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-358 (Supp. 1959) (certain financial limitations waived
if Y3 of the shareholders of each class concur)) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:23(5) (1951)
(purchase for purpose other than specified permitted if Y/ of the shareholders of each
class concur); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 294-28 (1955) (certain financial limitations
waived if 2/3 of those entitled to vote concur) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 10-1905 (Supp. 1957)
(certain financial limitations waived if 3/3 of those entitled to vote concur) ; OiaIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (Page Supp. 1959) (purchase for purpose other than specified per-
mitted if Y3 of the shareholders of each class concur unless the articles provide otherwise) ;
ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.035 (1959) (certain limitations waived if 2/3 of those entitled to
vote concur) ; TEXAS Bus. CORP. CODE ANN. art. 2.03 (1956) (certain financial limitations
waived if 3 of the shareholders of each class concur); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.385
(1957) (certain limitations waived if 3 of the shareholders of the same class and each
class of equal or prior rank concur). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-52 (Repl.
1960) (unless purchase is pro rata except when for specified purposes, a majority of those
entitled to vote must concur) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-701 (Supp. 1959) (certain
limitations waived if a majority of those entitled to vote concur).
See also Kessler, supra note 51, at 687-88 (proposed statute).
55. Clamon v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 72, 128 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955) ; see S.
Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 114, 93
N.E.2d 241, 249 (1950) (question involved allowance of derivative suit rather than ratifica-
tion, which is distinguished, id. at 111, 93 N.E2d at 247).
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votes of distinterested shareholders be counted, this added safeguard seems
inapposite. Since the issue is essentially a choice of management, counting the
votes of interested directors would seem as proper here as in a proxy contest.
And absent fraud, the vote of the interested shareholder might also be allow-
able.5 6
In theory, perhaps, subsequent shareholder ratification of the purchase would
also sustain the directors' action. But the likelihood of perfunctory approval is
even greater in this situation because the purchase has been completed and seems
incapable of being undone. If allowing subsequent ratification to validate the
purchase will in fact validate every such purchase, courts might close this loop-
hole by holding that the purchase was for an "illegal purpose" and cannot subse-
quently be ratified by shareholders. While some jurisdictions disagree,67 Dela-
ware and New York courts have stated that ratification will not cure fraudulent,
ultra vires or "illegal" acts.55 Since even Delaware, however, recognizes that
less serious breaches, such as unauthorized acts, can be ratified,5 9 the court must
first be able to characterize a Kors-type purchase as one of the more serious
offenses. Dictum in Delaware cases characterizing the use of corporate funds
for improper proxy expenditures as nonratifiable (o would seem to support this
position.
56. See Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 268, 273 (1951). See generally BALLANTINE, op. Cit.
supra note 36, § 71.
57. See cases cited note 55 supra.
58. See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1958); Toebelman v.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3rd Cir. 1942) ; Keenan v. Eshleman,
23 Del. Ch. 234,245, 2 A.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont,
206 N.Y. 7, 18, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912).
59. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct.
1948) ; see Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup.
Ct. 1952) (stock option plan, a gift of corporate assets, could not be ratified; profit sharing
plan merely voidable and could therefore be ratified).
60. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. Ch. 1957) ; Steinberg v. Adams,
90 F. Supp. 604, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying Delaware law).
Appendix A.
STATE LAW REGULATING A CORPORATION'S PURCHASE OF ITS SHAREs
I. Purchase is prohibited in no jurisdictions.
II. Purchase is permitted in 7 jurisdictions in the absence of statutory or self-imposed
restrictions, if made in good faith and without prejudice to creditors or other stock-
holders: Americanized Finance Corp. v. Yarbrough, 223 Ala. 266, 135 So. 448 (1931);
Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334, 95 Pac. 94 (1908) ; Bates Street Shirt
Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 Atl. 293 (1931); Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass.
171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949); Hoops v. Leddy, 119 N.J. Eq. 296, 182 Atl. 271 (Ch. 1936);
Shayne of Miami, Inc. v. Greybow, Inc., 232 S.C. 161, 101 S.E.2d 486 (1957); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 103 (1958).
III. Purchase is permitted in 11 jurisdictions if capital is not impaired: CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31-1-25 (1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953) ; IND. STAT. ANN.
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§ 25-202(8) (Supp. 1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.10(h) (Supp. 1959); NEB. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 21-140 (1954); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(3) (1959); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 14, § 1510 (Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-2-10(g) (1957); V. I. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.01.120 (1958); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3051 (1955).
IV. Purchasing is permitted in 6 jurisdictions out of "surplus" only (with varying
definitions of "surplus"): ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-109(e) (Repl. 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.13(9) (b) (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.22(6) (1947); N.Y. PENAL LAw §
664(5); S.D. CODE § 11.0303 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-117(9) (1955).
V. Purchase is permitted in 19 jurisdictions with the limitation that it be out of
"surplus," or without impairment of capital, but with those limitations waived if the pur-
chase is for certain specified purposes, provided that the corporation will not become in-
solvent due to the purchase: ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1957) ; CAL.
CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 1705-1708; D.C. CODE § 29-904a (Supp. VIII 1960); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1828(d) (Supp. 1958); HAwAii REv. LAWS § 172-25 (1955); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.6 (1957); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.5 (Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-3004 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271.135 (1953); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 32 (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.390 (1952) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 15-
801(9) (Repl. 1955); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 294.28 (1955); N.D. REV. CODE § 10-
1905 (Supp. 1957) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.136 (1953) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.035
(1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-701 (Supp. 1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-4
(Repl. 1956) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.385 (1957).
VI. Purchase is permitted in 6 jurisdictions only as provided for in detailed statutes
setting out limited specific uses of purchases: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-63 (1958) (after
Jan. 1, 1961, a new provision, placing Connecticut in category V Will be in effect, see
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-358 (1960)); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.23 (1951); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-52 (Repl. 1960); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (Page Supp.
1959) ; TEXAS Bus. CoRP. AcT CODE ANN. art. 2.03 (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-2-16
(1953).
VII. There is no pertinent statutory or case law in 4 jurisdictions: Idaho, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Wyoming.
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